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Abstract and Keywords
This article discusses political psychology and choice, starting with an overview of the 
recent emphasis on the importance of emotion in understanding political choices. This is 
followed by a discussion of the research that deals with the ability of citizens to process 
information without any bias. It then highlights the contributions of methodological 
innovations to an understanding of political psychology. The article concludes with 
several reflections on the political psychologists' emphasis on the importance of 
information, cognition, and rationality in research for the past few decades.
Keywords: political psychology, political choices, importance of emotion, methodological innovations
POLITICAL psychology is, at heart, concerned with the characteristics of individuals and 
of situations that are most conducive to a successful political system. For most political 
psychologists whose work is reviewed in this chapter, the ideal political system is a 
western‐style democracy, with individual rights and responsibilities for self‐governance, 
combined with varying degrees of protection of minority interests. For these reasons, the 
kinds of citizen choices that are most valued and most widely studied are ones that reflect 
these emphases. They include, but are not limited to, high levels of political information, 
active political participation, fair‐minded evaluation of political alternatives, and so forth.
Given the sheer volume of work in this burgeoning area, I cannot hope to do a thorough 
review of the many contributions of political psychology in recent years. Moreover, 
another recent volume in this same series, the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 
does an admirable job in summarizing the many developments in this field (see Sears, 
Huddy, and Jervis 2003). Thus, I have chosen to highlight three of the more recent trends 
and most promising new areas of investigation in political psychology that have emerged 
over the last few decades. I explore these particular themes not only because they are 
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recent, but also because they hold some promise of changing, in some fundamental way, 
how we think about political psychology.
This chapter begins with an overview of the recent emphasis on the importance of 
emotion in understanding political choices. Next, I turn to research dealing with the 
ability of citizens to process information in an unbiased fashion. This category (p. 81)
includes studies of motivated reasoning and selectivity, as well as research on the effects 
of partisanship and ideology on the processing of information. Third, I highlight the 
contributions of methodological innovations to our understanding of political psychology. 
While no one method is a cure‐all, recent advances in the field of neuroscience are 
opening up new approaches with the potential to help us better understand the black box 
psychological processing of political stimuli.
Finally, I conclude by reflecting upon political psychologists' emphasis on the importance 
of information, cognition, and rationality in research over past decades, examining 
rationality's use as a standard (both empirical and normative) for judging the quality of 
decision‐making processes. It is ironic that political psychology so often defines itself in 
opposition to rational choice approaches, and yet its standard for normative judgments is 
virtually the same.
1 The Role of Emotion in Political Choice
Over the last few decades, political psychologists have enriched our understanding of 
choice by incorporating emotion into models that were formerly almost exclusively 
cognitive in describing political decision‐making processes. In order to describe the 
progress (and lack thereof) in this domain, it is useful to first discuss several terms that 
are used more or less interchangeably within contemporary political psychology, 
including mood, affect, feeling, and emotion. As Kuklinski (2001) has noted, the study of 
these concepts within political psychology is still in its infancy, and “[we] do not always 
adopt the same conception of identically labeled psychological phenomena.” As a result, it 
is less clear than one might think what is and is not known about the role of emotion in 
political behavior. I begin by sorting through some of the most frequently used terms and 
operationalizations, and then turn to the difficulty of differentiating emotions from other 
phenomena.
Within political psychology, the term affect often is used to describe whether an individual 
likes or dislikes some political object, or whether it is positively or negatively valenced, or 
“affectively charged,” to use a popular terminology. Common measurement techniques 
such as feeling thermometers or Likert scales are used to ascertain an individual's 
positive or negative evaluation of some political person, policy, or object.
Unfortunately, this operationalization of affect is often difficult or impossible to 
distinguish from political judgments and opinions more generally. Few doubt that affect 
influences political attitudes and the processing of political information, but as it is 
usually measured by political scientists, such positive or negative judgments need not 
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necessarily result from emotional reactions. After all, one may feel positively or 
negatively toward a political object for reasons that are wholly cognitive in nature.
(p. 82)
It has long been acknowledged, for example, that the strongest predictor of candidate 
choice in the American National Election Studies (ANES) comes from the feeling 
thermometer ratings of presidential candidates (see e.g. Bartels 1988). Such measures 
are often referred to as indicators of affect toward the candidates, and yet this evidence 
is a weak basis on which to claim that emotion plays an important role in political choice. 
Thermometer ratings may instead represent running tallies of respondents' likes and 
dislikes about the candidate over time, which is a far cry from the kind of visceral 
reaction to a political event that the study of emotion promises to help us understand.
Just as like or dislike for political objects and measures drawn from feeling thermometers 
should not be considered synonymous with emotion, another seemingly related concept— 
mood—is also frequently conflated with emotion. Whereas emotions tend to be fleetingly 
experienced in response to a specific stimulus, and then dissipate, mood refers to a much 
longer‐lasting phenomenon. Moods are also less focused in their target than are 
emotional reactions (see Bless 2001).
Because of the inconsistent use of terms in the study of emotion and politics, and because 
of highly variable operationalizations of those same terms, it is difficult to draw a clear 
line between research on political attitudes and studies of political emotion. Researchers 
have proposed a variety of theories of emotion over the last century, but almost all define 
emotion in terms of physiological arousal, which is often (though not necessarily) 
combined with a cognitive label of some kind. To be consistent with most psychologists' 
definitions, political emotion should involve some kind of negative and/or positive 
reaction to a political object, along with a concurrent experience of arousal. This visceral 
reaction may occur below the level of conscious recognition, and is relatively automatic, 
that is, it need not be mediated by cognition.
Conceptually, emotions also are different from attitudes in that emotional reactions are 
relatively short‐lived and highly focused. Perhaps because emotion involves well‐known 
physiological symptoms, it is often assumed that people must know it when they feel it. 
But emotions need not be particularly pronounced or obvious to the person experiencing 
them. Although the natural tendency in studies of emotion and politics is to treat the 
political object that evokes the emotion as if it were the sole cause, the kind of cognitive 
label that people give to emotion is determined at least in part by cues present in the 
environment at the time. Likewise, when arousal is artificially induced unbeknownst to 
experimental subjects, they will nonetheless report experiencing an emotion and attribute 
it to something even though it was not the actual cause of their arousal.
A great deal of research within political science has focused on particular types of 
emotions, such as anxiety, anger, fear, or enthusiasm. This focus most likely results from 
the steady supply of self‐report measures of these emotions in the ANES and other 
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election surveys. Others have focused more on the extent to which emotional arousal 
occurs, without respect to the subspecies of emotion being experienced. Both approaches 
are relevant so far as they lead to an understanding of how emotions are involved in 
political attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately, the traditional survey (p. 83) method has 
made it difficult to disentangle the experience of emotional arousal from the cognitive 
assessment of the object and the labeling of the specific emotion.
To date, the most prominent theory tying emotion to political psychology is Marcus, 
Neuman, and MacKuen's (2000) theory of affective intelligence, which posits that affect 
ultimately serves to make citizens more sophisticated. When anxious about how things 
are going in the political world, this generalized anxiety drives a search for more 
information, and for better use of existing information resources. Thus greater political 
“intelligence” is induced by emotion, at least this specific variety. Drawing on ANES data, 
Marcus and colleagues argue that generalized anxiety about politics causes people to 
engage in more effortful information gathering and processing. As a result, they are less 
likely to rely on default heuristics such as party identification in informing their vote 
preferences, and more likely to seek out and rely on substantive information. According 
to their formulation, emotion plays an indirect role in promoting more effortful 
processing by motivating citizens to seek out and use more information. In other words, 
emotion is the driving force behind a process that ultimately improves the quality of 
political decision making. More specifically, Marcus and colleagues argue that a specific 
positive emotion—enthusiasm—elicits greater participation, whereas the negative 
emotion labeled anxiety elicits an information search.
The theory of affective intelligence has undoubtedly played an important role in renewing 
consideration of emotion in a field that has been heavily cognitive throughout its brief 
history. Perhaps even more importantly, this work has brought about reconsideration of 
the normative perspective on emotion that is common to most political psychology. Much 
of political theory has disdained the role of emotion in political decision making and, until 
recently, political psychologists have largely followed suit. Psychologists have recognized 
the important role emotion plays in intelligent functioning, and how cognition alone leads 
to serious dysfunction. Political psychologists have been slower to take up the defense of 
emotion as a potentially positive force in political decision making.
The theory of affective intelligence is not without its critics. Although few argue with the 
general logic of the theoretical framework, nor that emotions may serve useful (as well as 
potentially harmful) purposes in the political world, the empirical evidence supporting 
affective intelligence has been criticized as limited and inconclusive. For one, evidence is 
limited to retrospective self‐reports of emotional reactions. Evidence of affective 
intelligence hinges on the validity of survey questions asking respondents to tell the 
interviewer whether a given political figure has ever made them feel angry, afraid, 
anxious, enthusiastic, and so forth. While such measures have face validity, studies 
outside the political realm raise doubt that they provide accurate recall of previously 
experienced emotions. Without the presence of the emotion‐inducing event or object, 
such reports tend to be heavily mediated by cognitions (Breckler 1984). Likewise, 
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induced emotion is quite different from semantically activated reports of emotion. As 
Niedenthal and colleagues (2003, 327) suggest, “affect infusion…requires that the 
perceptual aspects of an emotion are experienced, not merely the semantic aspects.”
(p. 84)
In a related critique, Ladd and Lenz (2004) point out that while the theory of affective 
intelligence suggests that a generalized anxiety among members of the electorate drives 
greater engagement and the search for more information, empirical evidence is based on 
whether anxiety is reported to have been produced by specific candidates. Thus it is not a 
general emotional state that is operationally tapped in examinations of affective 
intelligence, but rather how one feels about a candidate or candidates. Using ANES data, 
Ladd and Lenz show, not surprisingly, that candidate preference and vote choice are 
related to comparative emotions toward the two candidates. The extent that one 
candidate produces more anxiety than another is strongly related to candidate 
preference. They argue that those reporting anxiety may, indeed, be more engaged, but 
only spuriously so, either because intensely held preferences drive both anxiety and 
engagement, or because political engagement leads to still stronger reactions to the 
campaign. As Ladd and Lenz note, the results seen thus far are consistent with evidence 
of affective intelligence, but they do not rule out other possible interpretations.
Clearly, some doubt exists regarding the specifics of affective intelligence, but few doubt 
that politics can be emotion provoking, nor that emotion matters to the political choices 
that people make. Although affective intelligence focuses our attention on the benefits of 
emotion for political behavior, emotion is also widely acknowledged to be potentially 
manipulative. As Brader and Corrigan (2005, 1) point out in their study of the emotional 
content of political advertisements, “The full significance of emotions for politics comes 
not because emotions influence the political behavior of citizens, but rather because 
political actors know that they do and try to capitalize on the power of emotions to 
achieve their goals.” Most consultants believe in the importance of emotional appeals, 
though these lay theories have not been validated by empirical evidence (e.g. Kaid and 
Johnston 2001).
Methodologically, political scientists find it difficult to study emotion as distinct from 
cognition. Survey data alone cannot make a strong case for emotions as a cause of most 
politically relevant outcomes (e.g. Glaser and Salovey 1998; Isbell and Ottati 2002). But 
even in experimental settings, efforts to manipulate emotion without changing the 
informational content of messages prove quite difficult. For example, in two experiments 
on the role of emotion in political advertising, Brader (2005) compares the reactions of 
subjects exposed to ads that include emotional cues for enthusiasm and fear to those that 
do not. Operationally, he does this by comparing a relatively negative script to a similar 
one that includes evocatively fearful images and music, and a relatively positive ad to one 
that includes enthusiastic music and images. He suggests that imagery and music are 
critical to emotional appeals, whereas verbal content is processed in highly cognitive 
ways. While there is some evidence that pictures are particularly good at inducing 
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emotional responses relative to words, like most scholars, Brader relied on the post hoc 
report of emotion.
It would be fairly simple to interpret the results of Brader's study if one could validate 
that information is entirely contained within the verbal content of communications, 
whereas changing the visual content and music alters only (p. 85) emotions. As 
psychological studies suggest, some words carry far more emotional content than others 
do, just as some pictures do (see Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 1997). But just as a picture 
is often said to be worth a thousand words, there is no clear way to change images and 
music within a presentation without also changing the information that viewers are given, 
and the context in which they are interpreting it. Within psychology, many researchers 
use standardized sets of words and pictures that allow them to roughly equate stimuli as 
strongly or weakly positive, negative or neutral in the emotions they elicit. But 
standardized stimuli like these have yet to be developed for political psychology. 
Moreover, to do so would be quite difficult. Whereas smiling babies and cute bunnies are 
consensually regarded as producers of positive affect in the psychology lab, George Bush 
could be one person's positive stimulus and another's strong negative one.
How else might researchers manipulate emotion without inadvertently changing other 
variables in their designs? In one study, subliminal cues were used to induce emotional 
reactions without viewer awareness and thus also without changing the visual or verbal 
information of which subjects were cognitively aware (see Weber, Lodge, and Taber 
2005). This approach has the advantage of holding information constant, but it probably 
also mutes the potential effects that emotion might have relative to real world examples 
of emotion‐inducing messages.
Furthermore, even if one does not seek to manipulate emotion, but instead measures it as 
an outcome, our usual methodological toolbox is limited in what it has to offer. The heavy 
reliance on emotion as reported by subjects after the fact casts serious doubts on the 
appropriate interpretation of many studies. If, as many psychologists suggest, affect is 
most often experienced extremely quickly and often in the absence of conscious cognitive 
awareness (see Zajonc 1980; Bargh and Chartrand 1999), then the usual approaches to 
measurement will not do. People only become aware of their emotions if they are very 
strong emotions, and most directed at the political world probably do not reach that level. 
As Alford and colleagues (2005, 20) summarize, “Emotion produces choices and behavior 
without much in the way of controlled cognitive deliberation that is introspectively 
transparent.” Even if one trusts self‐reports, there is the additional hurdle of getting 
subjects to accurately recall felt emotions. Civettini and Redlawsk (2005) find that when 
affect is reported immediately after a stimulus, and then recalled later in the same 
experiment, there are nonetheless high levels of error in their self‐reports.
All of this is problematic for what we political scientists ask of our survey respondents 
and experimental subjects. There is no easy solution, but it seems doubtful that post hoc 
self‐reports of emotion will continue to be defensible as the standard measure of 
emotional response. If political psychologists are convinced—as we seem to be—that 
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automatic, preconscious emotional reactions precede and shape the kind of subsequent 
cognitive processing that transpires, then there is little choice but to pursue alternative 
approaches. If we are to further an understanding of emotion and politics that is more 
than simply a repackaging of studies of political cognition, then we need to sort out our 
terminological inconsistencies and improve methods of measurement. Despite progress, 
we know far too little about the extent to (p. 86) which emotions are involved in political 
judgment. At best we can say that we have studied the effects of some emotions that 
citizens are aware of and can label, and can respond to in some purposive way. But that 
points to a huge limitation on current knowledge.
2 The Psychology of Biased Processing
Because of the ever‐increasing range of choice offered to citizens and consumers, one of 
the most active areas of political psychology research is the study of whether people are 
biased versus fair‐minded processors of political information. Do people assimilate 
information in a rational way, or do they raise the bar for convincing evidence when new 
information contradicts their existing views? Are they simply rational updaters who take 
new information and add it to their existing mix in order to formulate a new opinion? Or 
are they selective in what they expose themselves to and to what extent they revise their 
views accordingly?
This research is triggered in part by renewed interest in parties and partisanship in 
American elections. The early research suggesting that partisanship was declining in the 
1970s gave way to a consensus of “renewal” in the 1980s and 1990s (Fiorina 2002). The 
strength of the statistical relationship between party identification and vote choice rose 
continuously from 1972 to 1996, but this new consensus diffused relatively slowly 
throughout the discipline (see Bartels 2002). In addition, even widespread acceptance of 
the increased strength of this relationship has not necessarily meant that everyone 
agrees that party identification is now a stronger predictor of vote choice. As Fiorina 
(2002) points out, if party identification now works in concert with other determinants of 
vote choice that once predicted in opposite directions or not at all, then there may be 
good reason to call this new consensus into question.
More recently, Levendusky (2005) showed that party identification and ideology are much 
more tightly aligned now than in the 1970s. Whereas party ID and ideology were once 
largely orthogonal, liberals are now predominantly Democrats and conservatives are 
predominantly Republicans. This sorting process, he argues, has occurred as a result of 
elite polarization. When elites are ideologically polarized and send homogeneous signals 
about what it means to be a Democrat/Liberal and a Republican/Conservative, then the 
electorate “sorts” themselves into more consistent categories, largely by changing 
ideology to align with party identification.
Interestingly, what it means precisely to “identify” with a political party remains an 
unanswered question. Party identification is easily the most widely used concept in all of 
political psychology if not political science, but it has been reified to such an extent that 
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its meaning is seldom questioned, except in comparative contexts. Moreover, the extent 
to which people in various countries will self‐identify with a party hinges precariously on 
how the question is asked. In a study comparing a (p. 87) variety of approaches to asking 
about party attachments in Canada, the US, and Britain, Blais and colleagues (2001)
found that the extent of these publics willing to adopt these labels went from 76 percent 
to 48 percent, based on a minor change in the wording of the question.
Despite some skepticism about the newfound power of partisanship in the United States 
electorate, the strengthening of this statistical relationship has spawned a resurgence of 
interest in the extent to which partisanship biases the processing of political information. 
Whereas twenty‐five years ago one was more likely to read about partisanship in the 
academic journals as a source of high levels of political knowledge, mobilization, and 
attitude consistency, many contemporary political psychologists study partisanship as a 
source of bias in the processing of political information. Political parties have been at the 
root of the debate over biased assimilation from the very beginning of election research. 
As Angus Campbell and colleagues (1960, 133) argued, “Identification with a party raises 
a perceptual screen through which an individual tends to see what is favorable to his 
partisan orientation.” The theme of partisan resistance to new information persists in 
contemporary models of the vote, and it is argued to cause people to selectively consume 
information and/or selectively interpret the implications and importance of new 
information, so that it does not threaten their existing views.
Interest in selective perception and selective exposure has been with us since the earliest 
election studies (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944), but only recently have 
these basic ideas taken root in more complex models of information processing. 
Selectivity and biased processing represent one of the most active areas of research in 
recent political psychology. As the number of avenues for obtaining political information 
has increased, political psychologists want to know whether citizens select sources that 
are more likely to reinforce their existing views. Further, to what extent is new 
information interpreted and processed so as to reinforce existing beliefs, and to what 
extent are citizens responsive to new information?
One prominent example of the emphasis on motivated reasoning is Lodge, Taber, and 
colleagues' work suggesting that all political concepts are affectively charged as positive 
or negative, and that this information is stored in long‐term memory (see e.g. Taber, 
Lodge, and Glathar 2001; Lodge and Taber 2005). New information is not necessarily 
retained, but it is used to update the affective tags that are attached to these concepts in 
memory. When asked for an evaluation of a political concept, citizens are said to recall 
the affective tally attached to the concept. Feelings serve as a summary of information 
that is no longer accessible in memory. This model represents a relatively rational 
approach to choice, though not necessarily in the Bayesian sense of rational updating.
However, as Lodge, Taber, and colleagues (e.g. Taber, Lodge, and Glathar 2001) have 
pointed out, an accurate model of political reasoning must take into account that it is 
often motivated by goals other than accuracy. In their motivated reasoning model, the 
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online tally is not simply an unbiased account of previously encountered information. 
Instead, directional goals continually alter the processing and integration of new 
information into the tally. To the extent that the goal is to (p. 88) maintain one's prior 
beliefs (as opposed to pursuing accuracy), people may ignore or devalue contrary 
information. They may also seek evidence selectively, biasing the considerations they 
draw from memory, exercising different levels of scrutiny for disconfirming evidence, and/
or altering the weights attached to different criteria in a way that is less threatening to 
the prior belief. According to this model, directional goals “emerge spontaneously as the 
affective tags associated with elements of the problem represented in long‐term memory 
are brought into working memory (hot cognition).”
According to this model, the direction and strength of affect toward a political person or 
idea will cause most citizens to be “biased reasoners” who fail to treat new evidence 
fairly: “Most citizens most of the time will be decidedly ‘partisan’ in what and how they 
think about and reason about political leaders, groups, events, and issues” (185). 
Interestingly, advocates of this model suggest that it is neither wholly a vice nor a virtue. 
On the one hand, an online tally provides a better summary of one's past evaluations than 
preferences based on the recollection of specific pros and cons that happen to come to 
mind at any given point in time. The online model thus implies that choices are based on 
more information than is evident in assessments of knowledge made at the time of the 
decision. On the other hand, that same affective tally biases the processing of subsequent 
information, and is, in that sense, normatively undesirable.
Lau and Redlawsk (2006) have constructed a closely related model of motivated 
reasoning based on behavioral decision theory. In their model of the vote choice, they 
focus on the process of decision making and how individual motivations influence the 
extent to which voters choose correctly. They begin by accepting the notion that pre‐
existing preferences bias subsequent assimilation of information, but they attempt to 
determine where such motivations enter into this process. Using an interactive 
information board/computer screen that allows people to seek out information in order to 
make decisions, they suggest that bias enters into information gathering and processing 
at many points along the way to decision‐making. Surprisingly, voters who use a 
classically rational decision‐making process, that is, one involving a deep and balanced 
information search, “were in many circumstances less likely to make a correct decision 
compared to voters using an intuitive or fast and frugal strategy” (Lau and Redlawsk 
2005, 23). Barker and Hansen (2005) likewise question whether more information and 
deeper cognitive processing is the answer to what ails citizens. They found that subjects 
who engaged in systematic cognitive processing had weaker and less consistent attitudes 
than subjects in a control group.
Two recent studies stake out the ground on both sides of this important debate over 
whether citizens ultimately make good use of information. Gerber and Green (1999) use 
aggregate opinion data to argue that selectivity and perceptual bias are actually not the 
norm when citizens take in new information. Using over‐time aggregate data, they argue 
that Republicans, Democrats, and Independents all basically change their views in the 
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same direction and to the same extent as a result of new information. Based on an 
analysis of presidential approval among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, 
Gerber and Green (1999, 205) conclude (p. 89) that all three groups tend to go up and 
down together over time: “Only the faintest traces of selective perception are evidence 
from partisan tends in presidential approval. All three partisan groups move together—
sometimes markedly—as party fortunes change.” They applaud this pattern as rational in 
both the colloquial and Bayesian sense of the term. In other words, citizens appear to 
demonstrate Bayesian learning, with all groups making equally good use of new 
information as it comes along. If people were truly biased processors, they argue, their 
views would not move in parallel in response to ongoing political events.
If Gerber and Green's claim is correct, it has far‐reaching consequences for some of the 
most widely believed tenets of mass political behavior. Partisanship, in this view, is simply 
a running tally of information and judgments that have occurred over time. It summarizes 
information efficiently but has no influence on choice independent of the information and 
value judgments that it encapsulates. This conceptualization stands in sharp contrast to 
the traditional idea of partisanship as a driving force in how people perceive, interpret, 
and respond to the political world. According to Gerber and Green, information is key to 
understanding the political fortunes of candidates and policies, and the public responds 
roughly as if it were updating its views accordingly.
For most political psychologists, Gerber and Green's conclusion is shocking if not 
implausible. How could so many studies, laboratory and otherwise, demonstrate findings 
of resistance to counter‐attitudinal information, particularly in the context of political 
views that have been relatively stable throughout a person's lifetime? If prior views do, in 
fact, bias the processing of new information, one would expect this pattern to be 
observable in the realm of political decision making if it happens at all.
Interestingly, using the same standard model of Bayesian updating as the basis for his 
conclusion, Bartels (2000) suggests that biased processing is alive and well in the 
American public, with partisanship as its driving force. Bartels suggests that when 
oppositional partisan groups adjust their views in the same direction and to roughly the 
same extent over time, it is anything but evidence of Bayesian learning.
To help explain the basis for this difference of opinion, Figure 5.1 illustrates the same 
kind of over‐time evidence that convinced Gerber and Green that political psychologists' 
assumptions about biased processing were greatly exaggerated. As new information 
becomes available to all three groups—say, for example, news that the economy has 
improved—all three partisan groups move toward higher levels of presidential approval. 
The trendlines in Figure 5.1 exemplify this parallel movement in presidential approval, 
though obviously from groups that began with very different attitudes toward a 
Republican president in this hypothetical example. Downturns due to bad news such as 
economic decline would cause all three groups' approval levels to plummet, as they do in 
this illustration between 1985 and 1988.
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Fig. 5.1  Gerber/Green representation of Bayesian 
learning
Fig. 5.2  Bartels representation of Bayesian learning
In contrast, Figure 5.2
provides an illustration of 
what Bartels thinks 
Bayesian learning should 
look like in over‐time 
public opinion data. As 
new information becomes 
available—perhaps news 
that the economy has 
worsened—the three 
groups of partisans update 
their presidential approval 
ratings in light of their 
initial views. (p. 90)  In contrast to the Gerber/Green expectation, downward movement of 
approval due to negative information is not even across all groups, but is more 
pronounced in groups that begin with higher levels of approval. This occurs in a Bayesian 
model because the new information is more significant to the extent that it contradicts 
initial expectations. So, for example, in Figure 5.2 the decline in approval between (p. 91)
1981 and 1982 produces a shallower slope for Democrats, whose expectations for the 
Republican president were quite low to begin with. For Republicans, negative information 
of this kind is more of a surprise given their generally positive expectations, thus the 
extent of impact is greater for this group as shown by the steeper downward slope 
between 1981 and 1982. Most importantly, the net effect of Bayesian updating is some 
convergence of opinion. Whether the news is positive or negative, the three lines 
ultimately move closer and closer together over time. And even when the new information 
that citizens must incorporate is outside the range of expectation—better than even what 
the most supportive expect, or worse than what the most oppositional political group 
expects—the differential change in light of expectations should still bring the groups 
closer together if they are processing via Bayesian learning.
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Thus Bartels suggests that we should not find real data that mimics Figure 5.1
particularly reassuring in its implications. It substantiates, rather than refutes, the 
hypothesis of biased processing. Moreover, Bartels's conclusion comports with the bulk of 
evidence in political psychology—that is, that partisans are indeed biased assimilators 
and that patterns of Bayesian convergence such as what is illustrated in Figure 5.2 are 
uncommon.
Neither model, however, takes us through the full range of possibilities for how citizens 
respond to new political information. Thus far we have discussed these models in terms of 
events and information with clear positive or negative implications that all citizens would 
share. News that pollution levels have increased, or that unemployment is down, for 
example, would be received as negative and positive news, respectively, by all citizens. 
But new information about position issues as opposed to valence issues could easily 
create polarization within a Bayesian framework. For instance, if the “new information” 
about the president is that he vetoed a gun control bill, then Republicans should move in 
the more positive direction, if at all, and Democrats in a more negative direction. In this 
scenario, Bayesian learners should, quite rationally, polarize.
Whatever their differences, biased processing models are typical of contemporary 
political psychology in that they share an underlying skepticism that information is the 
cure for all that ails the quality of political decisions. If people are not passive recipients 
of information, but rather active choosers, interpreters, and rationalizers, then the 
limitations of information become apparent.
We are, in one sense, at an early stage in research that models biased processing, still 
sorting out what qualifies as evidence and what does not. To understand this process 
more fully in the future, researchers must unpack the process of biased assimilation in 
order to understand how bias occurs in the selection of information sources, the 
credibility granted to those sources, the discounting of information, and the relative 
weights given to new information in updating preferences. These are all separate 
mechanisms by which new information could differentially affect partisan groups based 
on their initial predispositions.
(p. 92) 3 Beyond Self‐Report: New Sources of 
Theory and Evidence
Methodologically, political psychology has been criticized for relying too heavily on cross‐
sectional survey data (e.g. Krosnick 2002). Although this criticism seems valid with 
regard to much of the past work in this subfield, a greater level of methodological 
pluralism is difficult to find in any other subfield within political science. Burgeoning 
pluralism is evident in the kinds of methods political psychologists use as well as in the 
types of measures they now employ to operationalize key concepts.
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In comparing early research in political psychology with today's studies, there is a 
striking difference in the extent to which political psychologists trust self‐reports as a 
means of getting at the black box processes involved in formulating political choices. For 
example, when authors of classics such as The People's Choice wanted to know why 
people voted the way they did, they simply asked them. In contrast, the consensus view 
today is that the reasons people offer for their decisions “are better understood as 
justifications of a decision that has already been made” (12). (See also Lau 1982; McGraw 
2000; Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994.)
For better or worse, humans appear to have little ability to introspect about the actual 
causes of their attitudes and actions. Nonetheless, they are disturbingly facile at 
rationalizing the choices and actions that they make. I say “disturbing” because as social 
scientists, we may be led on many a wild goose chase by people's abilities to rationalize 
their emotions and choices. In addition, it is disturbing to lose the comfort of believing 
that there is an accessible, transparent logic to individuals' political choices.
A dramatic example of the need to be skeptical of self‐report and introspective accounts 
of behavior is illustrated by Wegner (2002) in a study in which electrical stimulation was 
used unbeknownst to experimental subjects to force them to react involuntarily by 
standing up. Despite the fact that their decision to stand was completely outside of their 
control, a large percentage reported a logical reason why they did so. Our brains are 
apparently compelled to offer deliberate, conscious reasons for our actions, but these 
rationalizations may have little to do with what actually happens. If we cannot understand 
the origins of our decision to sit or stand, how can we possibly understand the origins of a 
far more complex decision such as a vote choice?
What options do intrepid explorers of the black box psychological processes underlying 
political choices have to turn to? The good news is that the methodological repertoire for 
political psychology has undoubtedly expanded over the past fifty years. In addition to the 
survey data that served as the initial springboard for interest in the psychology of 
political choices, scholars now make regular use of laboratory experiments as well.
But the expansion in methodologies has not been exclusively toward imitating the 
internal validity of psychologists' laboratory studies. In addition, experimental designs 
(p. 93) embedded within surveys provide researchers with new insights into 
understanding the basis of sensitive and socially undesirable political opinions and 
behaviors such as non‐voting (see Holbrook and Krosnick 2005) and negative attitudes 
toward racial minorities (Sniderman et al. 1991). What is more, field experiments have 
been brought back into the methodological mix as well, primarily by Green and his 
associates (see e.g. Green and Gerber 2002). Still others study the psychology of political 
decision making in the context of real world political choices, as Glaser (2002) did in his 
study of the effects of ballot structure on the outcome of school bond initiatives.
Recognizing that so much of what political psychologists want to know may transcend the 
realm of self‐report or even self‐awareness, scholars also increasingly pursue measures 
that do not require research participants' conscious awareness or introspection. 
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Response times in answering questions, for example, are used to better understand 
respondents' associations between positive or negative attributes and racial groups. In 
the most sophisticated applications of these techniques, researchers use complex designs 
to understand the associative links that facilitate attitudes.
The two most widely used paradigms for evaluating implicit (as contrasted with explicit) 
attitudes, are the “implicit association test” (IAT; see Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 
1998), and the “bona fide pipeline” (BFP; see Fazio et al. 1995). The IAT measures the 
strength of an association between two target categories (e.g. black and white) and two 
attributes (e.g. good and bad) by having people categorize examples of the target and 
attribute categories at the same time. So, for example, respondents would be presented 
with a test stimulus (e.g. a picture of a flower), and asked to sort what they observe into 
one category if it is either Black or good, or a second category if the object is either White 
or bad. The speed with which they perform this task across a number of stimuli is then 
compared to the speed with which they perform the same task with the two groups 
switched so that they sort objects into either a Black/bad category or a White/good 
category. In this particular example, negative attitudes toward Blacks would be assessed 
by comparing response latencies on the Black‐bad and White‐good trials to the Black‐
good and White‐bad trials. Interestingly, even when one knows how the test works and is 
aware of what is being measured, it is still next to impossible for respondents to falsify 
results by trying to respond more quickly to some pairings than others.
The BFP also measures implicit attitudes, but in this case a prime such as a Black or 
White face is presented before an adjective is shown. In this case, negative associations 
with Blacks would be demonstrated by faster latencies when Black faces and negative 
adjectives are shown, and slower latencies for Black faces followed by positive adjectives 
relative to the same latencies after the presentation of White faces.
Both techniques avoid the perils of self‐report and solve social desirability biases. In 
studies of racial attitudes, they also predict race‐related behaviors (Fazio and Olson 
2003). Although these are controversial measures of racial prejudice and of negative 
attitudes toward groups (see e.g. Arkes and Tetlock 2004), they are uncontroversial as 
indicators of the associations that people maintain, whether (p. 94) they act on them or 
not. One might well ask whether they are really necessary to political psychology outside 
of a few particularly sensitive topics such as race. The answer to this question remains to 
be seen, but as political psychologists increasingly seek understandings of phenomena 
outside the realm of conscious awareness, techniques of this kind will undoubtedly 
become increasingly valuable.
Finally, another set of methods involving psycho‐physiological approaches to political 
attitudes and behaviors has opened up new possibilities as political psychologists begin to 
see how social neuroscience and psycho‐physiological measurement techniques may be 
useful for understanding political attitudes and behavior. Technological advances in our 
ability to observe physiological evidence of the processes underlying political choice have 
drawn a small group of scholars to incorporate the tools of neuroscience into their work. 
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Although a thorough review of studies that employ psycho‐physiological and social 
neuroscience approaches is beyond the scope of this chapter, a special issue of Political 
Psychology published in 2003 (Volume 24: 4) provides useful examples of how social 
neuroscience is increasingly incorporated into political psychology. Given the field's focus 
on understanding real world political events, these techniques are not likely to replace 
traditional methods within political psychology, but they are a very promising means of 
augmenting our limited access to people's internal states.
Recently political psychologists also have begun to draw on evolutionary psychology as a 
basis for understanding reactions to the political world. For example, Alford, Funk, and 
Hibbing (2005) use the results of twin studies to distinguish the environmental 
determinants of political attitudes from their inherited traits. They conclude that attitudes 
toward a wide variety of political issues, as well as affect toward the major parties, is 
significantly influenced by genetic predisposition. Likewise, Sidanius and colleagues' 
theory about the role of gender in social dominance orientation is rooted in evolutionary 
psychology. Mutz and Reeves (2005) also draw on evolutionary psychology to understand 
viewers' reactions to incivility in televised political discourse.
To be sure, the potential applications of these approaches to political choice are in their 
infancy, but they appear relevant to some of the very same questions political 
psychologists have been trying to answer for years. For example, brain imaging studies 
demonstrate that activity in one area of the brain can bias what goes on elsewhere in the 
brain, thus bolstering conclusions about biased processing. Moreover, there appears to be 
no centralized location in the brain for integrating information and making choices (see 
Alford, Hibbing, and Smith 2005). Thus there is unlikely to be any one calculus for 
political decision making.
To date, very little of this evidence is directed toward answering the kinds of questions 
that plague political psychology, but the implications are clear. For example, McClure et 
al. (2004) show that judgments made about immediate versus delayed gratification 
activate different areas of the brain. As Alford and colleagues explain, “the time element 
stimulated different parts of the brain that are associated with different functions. 
Specifically, the possibility of immediate gratification seems to activate the emotional part 
of the brain, but when immediate gratification is not (p. 95) an option, the more reflective 
and cognitive part of the brain is activated.” As political scientists ponder how promises 
of tax cuts influence choice relative to long‐term promises to protect the environment, 
such findings may well become applicable.
4 Information as the Gold Standard
It is a profoundly erroneous truism…that we should cultivate the habit of thinking 
about what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances 
by extending the number of operations which we can perform without thinking 
about them. Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are 
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strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made at 
decisive moments. (Alfred North Whitehead, 1911)
If an extraterrestrial took a cursory glance at the books published in political psychology over 
the past fifteen years, she would come away with the impression that what we earth people 
value in our citizens is information, reason, and rationality. Consider, for example, Ferejohn and 
Kuklinski's Information and Democratic Processes (1990), Popkin's The Reasoning Voter (1991), 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock's Reasoning and Choice (1991), Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin's 
Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality (2000), Page and Shapiro's 
(1992) The Rational Public, and so forth. These books do not concur on all matters, but the 
desirability of rational, well‐informed political choices resonates throughout all of these volumes.
A closer look would reveal that the bulk of studies concur that people do not have loads of 
information about politics—indeed, far from it. But this closer examination would 
nonetheless suggest that most political psychologists wish citizens had perfect 
information, and think the political process would be far better off if citizens could at 
least better approximate this goal. As Kuklinski (2002) has suggested, rational choice 
assumes citizens are even‐handed processors of information, while political psychology 
tends to assume (and to find) that they are not, though it nonetheless argues that they 
should be.
In this respect, Whitehead's statement above may seem an anathema from the 
perspective of political psychology. What could be more sacred than the idea that good 
citizens should put a great deal of thought into the political choices they make? Are we, 
indeed, depleting citizens' resources by asking them to make too many political 
decisions? Or are we reaching the wrong conclusions by assuming that the best decisions 
are ones made based on the most information? It is worth remembering that the well‐
educated citizen was not always the gold standard in politics.
Contemporary political psychology is beginning to question whether a classic rational 
decision‐making process is truly what political psychology should pursue (p. 96) as its 
gold standard. In all three of the areas discussed in this chapter, political psychologists 
are reconsidering the emphasis on information and cognition as the root of ideal political 
choice. Studies of emotion and politics suggest that emotion is equally, if not more, 
important to political choice than cognition, and they question whether that is necessarily 
a bad thing. Studies of information processing suggest that information is severely 
limited in its capacity to improve political choice given the extent of biased processing; 
moreover, rational decision making does not necessarily mean better choices. As new 
approaches to measurement are applied to political choice, they further suggest that 
much of human decision making—political or otherwise—may be driven by processes of 
which citizens are not aware.
Taken together, these trends suggest that one of the most long‐lasting premises of 
political decision making—that information gathering, thinking, and reasoning make for 
superior political decisions relative to visceral, subconscious reactions—is being called 
into question. Whereas political psychologists in the past have thought of citizens as 
information processors, they are rapidly becoming seen as less purposeful and as having 
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less conscious control over their preferences. Whether such a representation of citizen 
choice is more accurate than the citizen as rational processor and/or more normatively 
desirable remains to be seen. In an era when voters are being asked to make more 
individual political choices than ever before, the horses may indeed need rest.
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